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INTRODUCTION
With the attainment of EMU's Stage 3, euro-area Member States have redenominated their outstanding debts and have begun to issue a dominant share of their debts using the same national currency (i.e. the euro). This milestone of the European financial integration has removed the exchange rate risk between currencies of participating countries and raised the degree of substitution between financial instruments supplied by Member States to finance their national debt. As a consequence, yield spreads on Euro-area sovereign bonds have reduced significantly. However, they have not fully converged, which leaves the literature room to investigate the determinants of these persistent differentials.
Liquidity factors, beyond credit ones, might have gained in relative importance in explaining the remaining level of these differentials. This paper looks at a particular determinant of liquidity-related spreads in euro-area government bonds.
Imagine the market as a field where investors are planning to plant their beans. A sudden and circumscribed drought would seriously undermine the appeal of the field. Investors would look for other fields to invest their money in, since growing beans in a dry ground would certainly involve higher costs. In a bond market, too little paper offered by borrowers would make investors struggle for liquidity and hence leave the market or require higher yields for the greater risk of holding more volatile securities. On the other hand, too much water would flood the field. This would temporarily challenge the capacity of absorption of the soil, leaving some beans floating and losing value. This description could well be suited to bond markets as well. If several borrowers issue similar bonds at the same time, the market would be flooded with too much paper. As a consequence, it would be more costly, i.e. it would require higher yields, to encourage the market to absorb the amount of debt proposed. The contribution of our paper lies in testing the significance of this latter problem, over-supplying liquidity due to a bunching of simultaneous issues, for the cost of debt in a government bond market where borrowers do not coordinate their issuance plans.
To do this, we exploit the information embedded in the issuance calendars published by Member States of the euro area. The analysis of issuance calendars allows us to identify some bunching phenomena, i.e. the contemporaneous issuance of bonds proposed by different countries but characterized by similar maturities. For example, between the 7th and the 8th of January 2004, Germany, France and Austria issued debt instruments with the same time to maturity (ten years). If the market is flooded with too much paper, a bunching in issues could end up raising the cost of issuance for sovereign borrowers. The present paper is the first attempt to test empirically for this hypothesis. Results obtained show the significance of the link between bunching in issues and higher yield spreads. Moreover, in line with existing literature, we find a negative correlation between liquidity (proxied by bid/ask spreads) and bond yields. Policy-making implications of our findings are important: agreements between euro-sovereign borrowers on dates and frequency of debt issuances could lower the cost of funding for Member States.
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The paper is set out as follows. Section 2 consists of a brief description of the relevant literature and of data used in the analysis. Section 3 presents the outcomes of the study and tests the robustness of the results. Section 4 concludes.
THEORY AND DATA
The importance of liquidity and market microstructure variables for the bond market finds support in the strand of the literature which investigates the main determinants of government securities yield spreads. Several studies belonging to this literature consider both market microstructure and credit risk variables as the main determinants of yield spreads. Favero, Pagano and Von Thadden (2005) offer a two-period general equilibrium model of bond pricing that predicts that yield differentials should decrease in liquidity and increase in risk. Hund and Lesmond (2006) test the importance of liquidity and credit risk in 16 emerging debt markets and conclude that liquidity appears to dominate credit risk in explaining cross-sectional variations in yield spreads. Moreover, Poterba and Rueben (2001) point out that credit risk influence should be less important if the countries considered are committed to follow anti-deficit rules. This finding is coherent with the evidence collected in EU (where Member States signed the Stability and Growth Pact) since German government bond yields are still below those of bonds issued by Member States which have better budget position, like Austria (Bernoth, von Hagen and Schuknecht, 2004) . Codogno, Favero and Missale (2003) consider the issue of distinguishing the influence of credit risk and microstructure variables while analyzing the determinants of yield spreads. They highlight the heterogeneity between market microstructure and credit risk relative speed of evolution: while microstructure variables impact yields at high frequency, risk-related variables reflect slow-moving economic fundamentals. Their article faces this issue by estimating: firstly, a model which considers the role of credit risk by using monthly series; and then, another model that studies the effect of liquidity factors in daily data. Biais et al. (2004) analyze empirically the determinants of Eurozone Treasury bill yields by focusing on market microstructure and macroeconomic variables. Particularly, their paper considers the percentage spreads between the Treasury security yield and the Euribor to control for exogenous changes in the general level of interest rates. Both the contributions of Codogno et al. (2003) and Biais et al. (2004) underline how issuance calendars could affect yield differentials. The importance of the timing of the issuance is also suggested by the contribution of Newman and Rierson (2004) which focus on corporate bonds and find that large debt issuances temporarily inflate yield spreads of bonds belonging to the same sector. Finally, the idea that bunching in issues could raise the costs of funding for sovereign borrowers that emit in the same date has been proposed in different articles (Coppola and Pacini, 2006; Bagella et al., 2007) but it has never been empirically tested.
The empirical estimates in this paper are based on the MTS Domestic Market Data Set for 11 European countries that we consider: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. Each data set lists the whole yield curve of the government bond market of the respective European country. A more detailed description of the debt instruments considered in the analysis is presented in Table 1.   3 For each market, each bond and each day considered, we focus on daily data regarding yields and liquidity. It is crucial to consider "high frequency" in the assessment of liquidity effects on yield spreads. Following Codogno et al. (2003) , we use daily data to analyze the impact of liquidity and liquidity-related variables since in the medium and long run the effect of these factors is reduced and credit risk becomes the main determinant of yield spreads. Keeping with the topic of gardening, in the medium and long run the level of watering is not so important. It is the kind of plant grown which really matters.
According to the approach described in Dufour and Skinner (2004) , yields used in the analysis are based on mid-quote prices, which are the prices collected from a quote at or before 5pm 4 Central European Time (CET) having bid/ask spread within 3*Basis Point Value (BPV). If the spread is beyond this limit, the mid-price is supposed to be non-representative. In other words, the yields considered for each bond are based on the last valid best proposals before 5pm CET. Following Biais et al. (2004) , we computed a percentage spread (s) between the bond yield (Y) and the Euribor (E) to control for exogenous changes in the general level of interest rates:
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The analysis performed by Codogno et al. (2003) considered the difference between total yield differentials and relative asset swap spreads to control for the exchange rate effect on yield differentials. The current paper does not compute this swap differential because it considers term spreads (between long-term rates s and short-term rates E) in a post-EMU period, when relative asset swaps coincide with yield differentials (Codogno et al., 2003) .
Liquidity is proxied by the daily average bid/ask (A) 5 . Bid/ask spread measures the tightness of the market, namely the distance between the transaction price and the mid-market price for each bond considered. In the same way we described for yields, in order to exclude non-tradable couples, the average bid/ask spread is computed using only observations having bid/ask spread within 3*BPV.
The whole analysis is focused on government bonds characterized by a current maturity equal or greater than two years. There are two main reasons for doing this. The first reason has an economic basis: the bunching effect tested in this paper should be negligible for some debt instruments with shorter maturity, like T-bills, due to their lower substitutability across member States, caused by preferences of national investors to hold same nationality-securities. The second reason is practical: bonds with a shorter current maturity have been replaced once or even several times by securities issued more recently and there is no quoting obligation for these "well off-the-run" bonds. The presence of these bonds among the data analyzed involves missing data problems (with respect to yield quotes and bid/ask prices) and entails spurious results. Time to maturity is indeed one of the main features of a government bond. In order to obtain more accurate results, the data sets have been disaggregated by grouping maturities into three main buckets: bonds with a current maturity around three years (maturity bucket A), five years (maturity bucket B) and ten years (maturity bucket C).
Issuance calendars are a very powerful source of information while studying government bond markets and sovereign borrowers' strategic behavior. In particular, we use issuance calendars to shed light on the issuance frequencies of each country considered, the degree of information disclosure related to different calendars and the presence of bunching in issuances, namely a situation where two different countries issue a security with similar features in a contemporaneous (same day) or nearly contemporaneous (the previous day or the following day) way.
A first evaluation of the data available from issuance calendar focuses on issuance frequencies. A simple computation of the average numbers of issuances per month points out how small borrowers issue less frequently than large borrowers like Italy, France and Germany (see Table 2 -Panel A). As their financing and rolling over needs are rather limited in absolute terms, they are required to issue in one shot a large share of their yearly needs so as to entice investors immediately to relatively liquid issuances. For large countries, such a need is less urgent; rather, they have to carefully smooth market issuances to avoid flooding the market with so much paper that the cost of issuance is negatively affected by it.
Furthermore, in our period, it appears that each country considered follows a certain pattern of within-the-week issuances. For example, Germany issues debt on Wednesday, while France and Spain issue the first and the third Thursday of each month. All regularities identified are summarized in Table 2 -Panel B. Accuracy of issuance calendar and the timing of their publication is a useful proxy to assess the degree of information disclosure provided by each one of the countries considered. Publishing calendars ahead of time and providing greater information to primary dealers may represent a competitive advantage for sovereign borrowers with respect to competing issuers. Results of this qualitative analysis show clearly that large borrowers provide a higher degree of information disclosure (see Table 3 ).
Beside the information extracted about issuance frequencies and information disclosure, we draw our attention on using issuance calendars to detect the presence of bunching phenomena and assess their effect. Since the attainment of EMU's Stage 3, a dominant share of Member States' debt is issued using the same national currency (i.e. the euro). As a consequence, yield spread differentials narrowed and debt issued by different European countries became close substitutes. In this framework, the higher degree of competition between Member States is the main reason of the inefficiencies related to a bunching strategy: contemporaneous or nearly contemporaneous issuances from competing borrowers could raise the costs of funding for each Member State 6 . The hypothesis tested in this paper stems from the idea that "bunching in issues" floods the market with so much paper that borrowers are forced to offer higher spreads to convince primary dealers to absorb their debt (Coppola and Pacini, 2006; Bagella et al., 2007) . In the attempt to test the significance of this effect given by contemporaneous or nearly-contemporaneous issuances 7 , we considered a series of "bunching" dummy variables (B j,t ), which are able to describe if two or more countries issue together. The first dummy variable takes value 1 if at least two countries issue together and 0 otherwise; the second dummy takes value 1 if at least three countries issue together and 0 otherwise; and so on. This approach allows us to evaluate the overall significance of the bunching effect and to assess the additional effect induced by further sovereign borrowers contemporaneous issuances.
The overall impact of contemporaneous issuances on yield spreads is probably driven by a set of different reasons (amount of debt issued, auction risks, hedging needs). For policy reasons, we are interested in the global effect of bunching in issues. The aim of the present paper is to test the significance of the bunching effect and the model proposed does not investigate its specific determinants. In this framework, it could be pointed that contemporaneous issuances from large borrowers (like France, Germany and Italy) could have a different impact with respect to the bunching produced by small borrowers. This issue will be directly tackled in a specific robustness section.
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
The Baseline Model
We verify if contemporaneous or nearly-contemporaneous issuances by different euroarea members have a significant impact on yield spreads. To test this hypothesis, a simple model based on market microstructure variables is used. There are already several studies in the literature which test the effect of microstructure variables on yield spreads. Biais et al. (2004) tested the impact of microstructure variables on T-bills spreads. Codogno, Favero and Missale (2003) faced the issue of distinguishing between microstructure and credit risk components of bond spreads. The importance of distinguishing between credit risk and microstructure variable is connected with the policy-making implications of the results obtained. To the extent that spreads reflect structural differences in credit standings between different countries, there is not much room to manoeuvre to reduce yield differentials further. On the other hand, if differentials are provoked by inefficiencies in the functioning of the primary market where bonds are issued, it is possible to tackle these market inefficiencies to minimize the costs of funding for sovereign borrowers.
For each country and each maturity bucket considered, the baseline model we estimate is: 
7 According to the definition provided in Bagella et al. (2007) , there is a "bunching in issues" when one country issues in the same day (t), in the previous day (t-1) or in the following day (t+1) with respect to other countries issuances. 
It is very important to distinguish between the issuance effect and the bunching effect, both of which basically produce a similar impact in the bond market, possibly raising yield spreads. However, the significance of these effects has different policy-making implications. With the issuance effect we refer to the impact of the choice of how often to issue on the market, a choice somehow constrained as a country naturally needs to finance its own debt. Whereas with the bunching effect, provoked by issuance-overlapping, potential inefficiencies can be avoided if Member States agree to smooth the amount of paper totally issued weekly or monthly in the primary market. From an econometric point of view, a model which does not discern these two effects could entail omitted variable problems: the "issuance effect" could be captured by the bunching variable and the statistical significance of the effect given by contemporaneous issuances could be biased. Moreover, to consider the issuance dummy variable is useful to control for potential causes of overpricing which do not depend from bunching in issues, like the on-the-run/off-the-run effect 12 .
Estimation Results
Estimation results for maturity bucket A (bonds with three years of current maturity) are presented in Table 4 -Panel A. When two countries issue together (
), the bunching of issues significantly raises yield spreads. In other words, when two Member States issue similar bonds (with a similar time to maturity) at the same time, the cost of issuance for each sovereign 8 Newly issued bonds are not quoted in MTS Time Series. As a consequence, these bonds are excluded from the analysis until their quotes are available. 9 Dummy variable I_{t} takes value 1 if there is a debt issuance in t, 0 otherwise. 10 Given that in the sample period considered there are maximum three countries bunching in issues, the number of bunching dummy variables is not greater than two. See the previous section for a detailed description of these dummy variables.
11 Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) analysis excluded the presence of collinearity among the explanatory variables. 12 Once a new bond of any maturity is issued, the previously issued bond with the same maturity becomes the off-therun bond. Because off-the-run securities are less frequently traded, they typically carry a slightly greater yield. borrower is greater. Similarly, when three countries issue together (
), yield spreads are significantly higher for the majority of the countries considered. The issuance effect is positive and significant for large borrowers (Italy, France and Germany). The liquidity effect, proxied by average bid/ask spread, is positive and significant for large borrowers and for the majority of small borrowers. This result is consistent with the findings of the literature. Wider bid/ask spreads characterize less liquid markets and force investors to require higher yields. Adjusted R² statistics show high values for all the regressions estimated 13 . Results obtained when considering maturity bucket B (bonds with five years of current maturity, see Table 4 -Panel B) shed further light on the bunching effect. The coefficients for the bunching variable are significant at the 1% level for the great majority of the countries considered, both when considering the bunching effect provoked by two countries issuing together and when considering the effect caused by an additional country bunching in issues. However, it is interesting to focus on the sign of the relationships estimated. When two countries contemporaneously issue the same kind of security, yield spreads are lower whereas a bunching of issues raises yield spreads when there are three countries issuing at the same time 5-year bonds. This non-linear effect could be explained in the following way. When two countries issue together 5-year bonds, the liquidity in secondary markets improves (given the high degree of substitution between the two debt instruments) and the yields offered are consequently lower. However, if the amount of paper exceeds a certain threshold (for example, when there are three countries issuing together 5-year bonds) the bunching effect changes sign and contemporaneous issuances raise the costs of funding for sovereign borrowers. The issuance effect estimated for maturity bucket B is positive and significant at the 1% level. The comparison of this result with the estimations for maturity bucket A suggests that the overpricing caused by an on-the-run/off-the-run effect is more significant when considering bonds with a longer time-to-maturity. Liquidity effect for maturity bucket B is positive and significant at the 1% level for the majority of the countries considered. With respect to adjusted R² statistics, estimation results are lower than those obtained when analyzing maturity bucket A.
Finally, estimation results for maturity bucket C (bonds with ten years of current maturity, see Table 4 -Panel C) confirm what it has been inferred considering bonds with shorter maturity. The bunching effect is significant at the 1% level for all the countries considered 14 . Similar to 5-year bonds, the bunching in issues caused by two Member States raises the liquidity in secondary markets and reduces the yield spreads but the excess supply of similar securities (that could be provided by three countries issuing together 10-year bonds) lowers bond prices and consequently increases the yields offered. The issuance effect estimated for maturity bucket C is positive and significant at the 1% level for all the countries confirmed. Therefore, this result confirms that the on-the-run/off-the-run effect is more significant when considering bonds with a longer maturity. Like for maturity bucket A and B, the liquidity effect is positive and significant for the majority of the countries considered. The fit measure shows higher values than those obtained for maturity bucket B.
Overall, the bunching variable has the sign and significance predicted by our hypothesis for all the countries analyzed and for all the maturity buckets considered. It is only the result of an empirical exercise based on a very simple model. Nevertheless, these results support the hypothesis that an excess supply of securities with similar features force borrowers to offer higher yield spreads and imply that euro area public debt managers should carefully take into account the information derived by issuance calendars to minimize the cost of funding for Member States. Moreover, the significance of the effect estimated gains weight if we consider the chance that the model proposed does not fully perceive the importance of the bunching effect, given the structure of the sovereign bond market. Since all the countries considered publish in advance their issuance calendars (see Table 3 ), the market knows in advance when there will be a bunching in issues. As a consequence, the global bunching effect could be underestimated since the model proposed is considering the effect produced in the bunching dates but it is not taking into account the effect originated when calendars are published or amounts to be issued are announced.
The Impact of Large and Small Borrowers Issuances
The analysis of the bunching effect can be deepened by distinguishing between the bunching in issues caused by large borrowers (Italy, France and Germany) and the one due to small borrowers (the remainder of the countries considered). In fact, it makes sense to consider separately the impact of large borrowers bunching in issues and the small borrowers' one, since the amount of debt issued each year by Italy or France or Germany is evidently larger than the amount issued by small borrowers like Ireland, Finland or Austria. As a consequence, it is worthwhile to re-consider the baseline model by estimating separately the following equations:
where is the bunching dummy variable built by considering only large borrowers issuances belonging to the same maturity bucket of the i-th bond and 
where is the bunching dummy variable built by considering only small borrowers issuances belonging to the same maturity bucket of the i-th bond.
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Results obtained (see Table 5 and 6) show the value added of these additional analyses since there is evidence of some differences between the bunching effect caused by large borrowers and that one provoked by small borrowers' contemporaneous issuances. When considering the bunching in issues due to large borrowers, with respect to the maturity bucket including 3-year bonds, estimation results (see Table 5 -Panel A) confirm the findings previously obtained. The bunching effect significantly increases yield spreads for the majority of the countries considered. However, a closer look to the estimation results reveals that only the three smallest sovereign borrowers (Austria, Finland and Ireland) are not affected by the large borrowers bunching effect. This result gains interest when considering the bunching effect caused only by small borrowers (see Table 6 -Panel A). The small borrowers bunching effect on Austrian and Irish bonds is positive and significant at the 5% level and the effect on Finnish bonds is even more significant (1% level). These results could reflect the higher degree of substitution between the bonds issued by Austria, Finland and Ireland and those issued by the other small borrowers compared with the relationship between the bonds issued by these three smallest borrowers and the largest ones (France, Italy and Germany). From a different point of view, it is an indirect confirmation that the high degree of substitution between Euro-bonds is the basic reason for the significance of the bunching effect and the inefficiencies related to a bunching in issues.
When considering bonds with 5 years of maturity, the distinction between large and small issuances provides a descriptive result. Small borrowers are never bunching in issues in the sample period considered. In particular, the analysis of the issuance calendars for 2004 indicates that small borrowers issue together but offering to the market bonds with different time-to-maturity. The aim of this behavior is likely to be one of generating a euro yield curve capable of increasing the strategic opportunities for traders and -hence -to raise the liquidity in the secondary markets (Bagella et al., 2007) . Given this descriptive result, the bunching effect tested in the previous paragraph was the consequence of two large borrowers issuing together or a small borrower bunching in issues with one or two large ones. If we focus only on large borrowers issuances, estimation results support previous considerations about the existence of a liquidity threshold which discriminates the sign of the bunching effect. The amount of paper issued by two large borrowers is above the threshold for the 5-year bond market. Therefore, the large borrowers bunching effect significantly raises yield spreads (see Table 5 -Panel B).
Estimation results for the 10-year bond bucket confirm the significance of the bunching effect and provide further evidence about the existence of a liquidity threshold. The bunching effect of two small borrowers lowers yield spreads and this is consistent with the findings of the previous paragraph (see Table 6 -Panel B) . Differently from what happens for the 5-year maturity bucket, yield spreads are lower even if two large borrowers are bunching in issues (like the amount of debt issued is still below the liquidity threshold). However, when three sovereign borrowers (either large or small) issue together, the bunching effect increases yield spreads. An additional finding stemmed from our results is that the threshold for 10-year bond market appears to be higher than the one for bonds with 5 years of maturity 15 . In other words, longer maturity government bond markets seem to have a higher capacity to absorb paper compared with shorter maturity bond markets. This hypothesis is supported by the empirical evidence 16 . Coefficients estimated for the other variables considered in the model (liquidity effect and issuance effect) are generally positive and significant at the 1% level for all the maturity buckets considered. This is consistent with the findings of the baseline model. 15 This is the outcome of the analysis on the sample period considered. More generally, the level of this threshold is a function of several variables (maturity bucket considered, amount of expiring bonds, bond market liquidity, global financial market liquidity). The variability of the liquidity threshold supports the approach of measuring the bunching effect by considering the number of countries issuing together rather than using a quantitative variable such as the amount of debt issued. 16 Indeed, given the sample period considered, the average size of the issuances increases with the time-to-maturity of the bonds issued.
CONCLUSION
Which are the determinants of yield spreads? Economic and financial literature investigated deeply this issue and pointed at different angles to look at the same problem. The present paper belongs to the strand of literature which considers how market microstructure might influence government bond yields. In particular, this paper tests for the significance of a liquidity effect and a bunching effect, i.e. the effect caused by contemporaneous issuances of bonds proposed by different countries but characterized by similar maturities.
In line with existing literature, we find a positive correlation between bid/ask spreads and bond yields, therefore a negative correlation between liquidity and yields offered. When bid/ask spreads are wider, bond yields are higher in order to compensate the higher transaction costs determined by illiquidity. Apart from this, the main contribution of this paper is to assess whether contemporaneous issuances have a significant impact on yield spreads. Some articles have already pointed out the potential effects of a bunching in issues, given the high degree of substitution between Euro bonds. Contemporaneous issuances could flood the market with so much paper that sovereign borrowers would be forced to offer higher spreads in order to convince primary dealers to absorb their debt. This contribution is the first attempt to empirically investigate the significance of the bunching effect.
Using daily data from the 1st of January to the 31st December 2004, we find that an excess supply of similar securities raises yield spreads. When considering government bonds with three years of maturity, the impact of contemporaneous issuances of two or more countries is positive and significant at the 1% level. When considering bonds with longer maturity, the impact is negative when two countries issue together and positive when three countries are bunching in issues. These results underline the importance of liquidity in government bond markets. When two countries issue together similar securities, the liquidity in secondary markets improves and the yields offered are consequently lower. However, if the amount of paper exceeds a certain threshold (for example, when three countries issue together) the bunching effect changes sign and contemporaneous issuances raise the costs of funding for sovereign borrowers. The robustness of the findings obtained has been tested by controlling for an issuance effect (i.e. the effect on yields spreads provoked by a single issuance) and by distinguishing between the bunching caused by large borrowers (like Italy, France or Germany) and that one due to small borrowers (the other countries considered). Moreover, robustness analysis results corroborate the hypothesis that the significance of the bunching effect is related to the degree of substitution across bonds.
Furthermore, the analysis has policy implications. To the extent that yield spreads depend on bunching in issues, agreement between sovereign borrowers on dates and frequency of debt issuances could significantly lower the costs of funding for Member States. Table 3 provides a qualitative assessment of the information disclosure provided by each Member States. Asterisks distinguish the information provided. Austria, Belgium, Netherlands and Spain (one asterisk) communicate in which days there will be auction procedures during the following 12 months without providing any additional information on the instruments which will be issued. France and Italy's calendars (two asterisks), with respect to Austria, Belgium, Netherlands and Spain, provide some additional information about the maturity of the instruments which will be issued. Finally, Germany's calendar (three asterisks) provides information about the issuance month, maturity and volume of the instruments which will be issued but no information on auction dates. The tables summarize the estimation results for model (2). B 2 measures the bunching effect caused by 2 countries issuing together. B 3 measures the additional effect of a third country bunching in issues. A is the proxy for the liquidity effect and I controls for the issuance effect. # Bonds and # Obs. stand for the number of bonds and observations available for the sample period considered. Asterisks identify the degree of significance of the coefficients estimated: one, two and three asterisks stand for the rejection of the null hypothesis at the 10% level, at the 5% level and at the 1% level, respectively. The tables summarize the estimation results for model (3). B 2 measures the bunching effect caused by 2 countries issuing together. A is the proxy for the liquidity effect and I controls for the issuance effect. # Bonds and # Obs. stand for the number of bonds and observations available for the sample period considered. Asterisks identify the degree of significance of the coefficients estimated: one, two and three asterisks stand for the rejection of the null hypothesis at the 10% level, at the 5% level and at the 1% level, respectively. The tables summarize the estimation results for model (4). B 2 measures the bunching effect caused by 2 countries issuing together. B 3 measures the additional effect of a third country bunching in issues. A is the proxy for the liquidity effect and I controls for the issuance effect. # Bonds and # Obs. stand for the number of bonds and observations available for the sample period considered. Asterisks identify the degree of significance of the coefficients estimated: one, two and three asterisks stand for the rejection of the null hypothesis at the 10% level, at the 5% level and at the 1% level, respectively.
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